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I. INTRODUCTION 
As of 2005, over 2,000 Americans were serving life sentences for 
offenses they committed as children.1 Approximately fifty-nine 
percent serve this time for a first and only criminal conviction; sixteen 
percent of those sentenced to life terms committed their crime(s) 
between ages thirteen and fifteen.2 Moreover, the imposition of these 
sentences within the U.S. varies greatly: several states mete out 
juvenile life without parole (“JLWOP”) prison terms at three to 
seven-and-a-half times the national average, while other states have 
no children serving the sentence.3 
2011 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. The author also contributed to the Brief 
of Juvenile Law Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sullivan v. Florida (No. 08-
7621) and Graham v. Florida (No. 08-7412). 
 1. The Rest of Their Lives: Life Without Parole for Child Offenders in the United States, 
(Hum. Rights Watch/Amnesty Int’l, New York, N.Y.), 2005 [hereinafter The Rest of Their 
Lives]. This Commentary uses the terms juvenile, youth, child and children interchangeably to 
refer to individuals under the age of eighteen. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 2. Additionally, the United States is the only country that sentences child 
offenders to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Connie de la Vega and Michelle 
Leighton, Sentencing our Children to Die in Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F.L. REV 
983, 985 (2008). See id. at 1044 (listing Tanzania as only other country currently with a child 
serving LWOP sentence, but specifying Tanzanian government is in process of reforming 
sentencing code for that and all future child offenders). In addition, the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by all countries except the United States and 
Somalia, explicitly prohibits “life imprisonment without possibility of release” for “offenses 
committed by persons below eighteen years of age.” United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (UNCRC), ¶ 37, (Sept. 2, 1990), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm. See the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (UNCRC), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm. 
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Two cases before the Supreme Court this term address the 
constitutionality of sentencing juveniles to life in prison for non-
homicide offenses. In Sullivan v. Florida4 and Graham v. Florida,5 
Petitioners argue that JLWOP violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence is 
disproportionally harsh for non-homicide crimes committed by 
minors. Respondents counter that the sentences are not grossly 
disproportionate and instead reflect the legitimate penological 
purposes of protecting society from violent offenders. Respondents 
also point to the continued statutory validity of the punishment in 
most states and other objective indicia of a lack of national consensus 
against the punishment. This commentary will lay out the specific 
facts of each case, briefly outline the legal background and arguments 
put forth by each side, and predict how the Court will decide the issue. 
II. FACTS 
A.  Joe Harris Sullivan 
Joe Harris Sullivan was sentenced to serve a term of life without 
the possibility of parole in adult prison for an incident that occurred 
when he was thirteen years old, in 1989.6 Two older boys convinced 
Sullivan to join them in committing a burglary.7 The three entered an 
unoccupied home and one of the older boys took jewelry and money. 
They then left the premise without further incident.8 Some time that 
afternoon, the occupant of the home, Lena Bruner, was blindfolded, 
beaten, and raped by an assailant she never saw.9 Based on the 
testimony of the older boys, Joe Sullivan was tried and convicted as an 
adult for the rape.10 The State presented no biological evidence.11 At 
 4. Sullivan v. Florida, 987 So.2d 83 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2157 
(2009). 
 5. Graham v. Florida, 982 So.2d 43 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2157 
(2009). 
 6. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2008). 
At that time, the mentally disabled Sullivan endured repeated sexual and physical abuse at 
home. Brief of Petitioner at 22 n.25, Sullivan, No. 08-7621 (U.S. Jul. 16, 2009) [Hereinafter 
Sullivan Brief of Petitioner]. The record does not make clear the extent of his disability. 
 7. Joint Appendix at 26, Sullivan, No. 08-7621, (U.S. Jul. 16, 2009) [Hereinafter Joint 
Appendix]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. See also Brief of Respondent at 5, Sullivan, No. 08-7621 (U.S. Jul. 16, 2009) 
[Hereinafter Sullivan Brief of Respondent] (noting that Bruner’s assailant put a “black slip” 
over her head before beating her and raping her both vaginally and orally). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Joint Appendix, supra note 7, at 26. 
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Sullivan’s trial, which lasted less than a day, Bruner testified that 
Sullivan’s voice “sound[ed] like” that of her assailant.12 The jury 
convicted Sullivan on five counts: two counts each for burglary of a 
dwelling and sexual battery, and one count of grand theft.13 Because 
Sullivan had an extensive criminal record, the trial judge treated him 
as an adult and sentenced him to life in prison on the sexual battery 
charges.14 
Sullivan’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief 
15 and withdrew from the case.16 The appellate court affirmed 
Sullivan’s conviction, and the Florida Supreme Court denied review. 
Neither issued an opinion explaining its ruling.17 
Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court held in Roper v. Simmons 
that sentencing a juvenile to the death penalty violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.18 Relying on 
that decision, Sullivan filed a motion for post-conviction relief,19 
arguing that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments make it 
unconstitutional to impose a life without parole sentence on a 
thirteen-year-old convicted of a non-homicide offense.20 The trial 
court dismissed the motion with prejudice on procedural grounds,21 
 12. Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 6 n.8, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-
7621 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2009) [Hereinafter Sullivan Reply Brief in Support of Petition for 
Certiorari]. 
 13. Sullivan Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 4–5. Additionally, Sullivan’s lawyers 
maintain that he is actually innocent of the crime, pointing to the fact that Bruner never saw 
him, identified him only by his voice (without any other voices to which to compare it), and that 
the older boys who testified against him both received only short sentences in juvenile detention 
facilities for the burglary, to which all three admitted. Reply Brief in Support of Petition for 
Certiorari at 3. 
 14. Sullivan Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 6. 
 15. Sullivan Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari, supra note 12, at 7; Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (establishing a standard in which counsel asserts there are 
no issues worth raising on appeal). 
 16. See Sullivan Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari, supra note 12, at 7. 
 16. Joint Appendix, supra note 7 at 1. 
 17. Id. at 3. Additionally, in 2007, Sullivan’s newly obtained counsel filed a motion for 
DNA testing, which was denied because the state had destroyed all the related biological 
evidence related to the case. Id. at 2. 
 18. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit the execution of juveniles under age eighteen when they committed their 
crimes). 
 19. This motion was filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b), which 
provides an exception to a bar on appeals filed more than two years after a final sentence in a 
noncapital case when “the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within 
the period provided for herein and has been held to apply retroactively.” Sullivan Brief of 
Respondent, supra note 9, at 2. 
 20. Joint Appendix, supra note 7  at 3, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (U.S. Jul. 16, 2009). 
 21. Id. at 4 (declining to extend Roper to a non-capital case). See also Sullivan Brief of 
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but added that Sullivan’s claim was meritless in light of post-Roper 
Florida state court decisions.22 
The First District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed without 
opinion and subsequently denied Sullivan’s motion for rehearing 
and/or certification to the Supreme Court of Florida.23 Because the 
court of appeal had not issued an opinion, the Supreme Court of 
Florida could not review his motion.24 Sullivan’s subsequent petition 
for writ of certiorari was granted on May 4, 2009.25 The precise 
question before the Court is whether the imposition of a life sentence 
without the possibility of parole on a thirteen-year-old for a non-
homicide offense constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment 
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”26 
B.  Terrance Jamar Graham 
At sixteen, Terrance Jamar Graham was convicted as an 
accomplice to an armed burglary and attempted armed robbery of a 
restaurant in 2003.27 Though Graham did not engage in violence or 
take money,28 he was charged in adult court because his codefendant 
had used a pipe to assault the restaurant owner.29 Graham pled guilty 
to the charges and received a sentence of one year at a pre-trial 
juvenile detention facility and, thereafter, three years of probation.30 
After serving his sentence, Graham was released on June 25, 
2004.31 In January 2006, Graham was convicted of violating his parole. 
The State presented evidence that on December 2, 2004, Graham and 
two codefendants forcefully entered a man’s apartment and robbed 
him while Graham held him at gunpoint.32 Nineteen at the time, 
Respondent, supra note 9, at 7. 
 22. Sullivan Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 7. 
 23. Joint Appendix, supra note 7, at 74; Sullivan v. Florida, 987 So. 2d. 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2008). 
 24. Sullivan Brief of Respondent, supra note 9, at 7. 
 25. Id. at 8. 
 26. Joint Appendix, supra note 7, at (i). 
 27. Graham v. State, 982 So.2d 43, 45 (Fla. App. 1 Dist., 2008). At the time, Graham’s 
parents struggled with crack cocaine, and Graham suffered from long-term depression and 
ADHD, for which he was prescribed medication but discouraged by his mother from taking it. 
See Brief of Petitioner at 11, Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412 (Jul. 16, 2009) [Hereinafter 
Graham Brief of Petitioner]. 
 28. Id. at 12. 
 29. Id. at 12–13. 
 30. Id. at 13–14. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Graham v. State, 982 So.2d 43, 45 (Fla. App. 1 Dist., 2008); Brief of Respondent at 8, 
Graham, No. 08-7412 (Jul. 16, 2009) [Hereinafter Graham Brief of Respondent]. 
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Graham had only the one previous conviction, for the restaurant 
burglary.33 He was never tried for the home invasion.34 Instead, the 
trial court convicted him of the parole violation on evidence of 
firearms found in his car, testimony from the victim, and testimony 
from one of Graham’s accomplices in the home invasion.35 He 
received Florida’s statutory maximum penalty for violating 
probation—life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.36 
Graham filed a post-sentencing motion in the state trial court, 
which did not rule on his motion within the requisite sixty days, and 
thus deemed it denied.37 The First District Court of Appeal of Florida 
rejected Graham’s appeal challenging the constitutionality of his 
sentence under the Eighth Amendment,38 and the Supreme Court of 
Florida denied discretionary review.39 The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on May 4, 2009.40 Graham’s case seeks to 
answer the slightly broader question of “[w]hether the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments prohibits the 
imprisonment of a juvenile for life without the possibility of parole as 
punishment for the juvenile’s commission of a non-homicide.”41 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution bans 
“cruel and unusual punishments.”42 The Court has repeatedly 
recognized that the Amendment’s protection “flows from the basic 
‘precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated 
and proportioned to [the] offense.’”43 In determining what constitutes 
a cruel and unusual punishment, the Court has refined an analysis of 
the proportionality of the sentence imposed to the harm committed.44 
 33. Id. 
 34. Graham Brief of Petitioner, supra note 27, at 17. 
 35. Graham Brief of Respondent, supra note 32, at 12. 
 36. Id. at 2. 
 37. Graham, 982 So. 2d at 54; Graham Brief of Petitioner, supra note 27, at 23. 
 38. Graham Brief of Petitioner, supra note 27, at 23. 
 39. Id. at 24. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at (i). 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. While the Fourteenth Amendment is also implicated in this 
case, none of the parties or amici questions its relevance (because it is settled that the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment to the states), or engages in any 
depth of analysis on the topic and it is accordingly omitted from discussion in this Commentary, 
as are all other legal issues. 
 43. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008) (quoting Weems v. United States, 
217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (finding the death penalty unconstitutional for child rapists)). 
 44. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 584 (1982) (finding the death penalty grossly 
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The Court has emphasized the need for objective factors to determine 
the gravity of the offenses in comparison to the criminal sentences,45 
in order to assess the constitutionality of those sentences based on 
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”46 The first step involves analyzing objective indicia 
of public stances toward the particular punishment, such as state law 
trends and jury decisions, to determine whether a national consensus 
indicates what the evolving standards of decency are.47 Upon 
concluding this examination, the Court exercises its judgment to 
determine whether the punishment is cruel and unusual.48 Toward 
that end, the Court analyzes whether the punishment in question 
furthers its stated goals, such as retribution and dete
Throughout the last few decades, the Court has established and 
applied several objective criteria to determine whether sentences are 
proportional to the crimes for which they are given. The 1983 case of 
Solem v. Helm looked to three factors, “(i) the gravity of the offense 
and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other 
criminals in the same jurisdiction. . .; and (iii) the sentences imposed 
for the same crime in other jurisdictions.”49 If these objective factors 
indicate that the punishment is “significantly disproportionate” to the 
crime, the Eighth Amendment prohibits it.50 The Solem Court 
emphasized that Eighth Amendment analysis should also examine the 
“culpability of the offender,”51 including an assessment of how 
intentional his conduct was and his motive for acting.52 
In Harmelin v. Michigan, a plurality of the Court strayed from 
disproportionate and excessive for a crime of rape of an adult woman); Enmund v. Florida, 458 
U.S. 782, 782 (1982) (holding the death penalty disproportionate to the crime of felony murder, 
when “the defendant did not take or attempt or intend to take life, or intend that lethal force be 
employed”); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 277 (1983) (holding life without parole 
disproportionate punishment for falsifying a check when the defendant had only relatively 
minor prior offenses). 
 45. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274–75(1980)). 
 46. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 47. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552 (2006) (finding that “the objective indicia 
of national consensus” including “the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of 
States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the 
trend toward abolition of the practice” mandated invalidating the punishment); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–15 (2002) (invalidating the death penalty for mentally retarded 
defendants as cruel and unusual punishment). 
 48. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 563; Kennedy, 128 S. Ct at 2650. 
 49. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. 
 50. Id. at 303. 
 51. Id. at 294. 
 52. Id. at 293–94. 
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applying the Solem factors in favor of employing an originalist 
analysis of the Eighth Amendment’s purpose.53 Justice Scalia, writing 
for the plurality, concluded that 
the Americans who adopted the Eighth Amendment intended its 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as a check on the ability of 
the Legislature to authorize particular modes of punishment—i.e., 
cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily 
employed—rather than as a guarantee against disproportionate 
sentences is demonstrated by the available evidence of 
contemporary understanding.54 
Justice Scalia specifically renounced the first two factors 
elucidated in Solem as providing too much room for judges’ personal 
views to influence their constitutional interpretations of the sentences, 
and the third as “irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment.”55 The Court 
ultimately concluded “that Solem was simply wrong; the Eighth 
Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee.”56 Scalia’s 
criticism of the doctrine allowing judges to exercise their own 
judgment about whether a punishment is cruel and unusual is a 
minority view on the Court.57 
In Harmelin, Justice Kennedy acknowledged the partial validity of 
the Solem decision in that a sentence may violate the Eighth 
Amendment in cases that give rise to “an inference of gross 
disproportionality”58 based on a comparative analysis of the 
punishment imposed to the crime committed.59 Kennedy identified 
five principles that guide the Court’s analysis of whether a 
punishment establishes such an inference, including the 
“requirement” that objective factors dictate a sentence’s 
proportionality analysis.60 Only if that inference has been established 
does it become appropriate to compare the sentence to others both 
 53. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 958 (1991) (holding constitutional life without 
parole for possession of over 650 grams cocaine). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 965. 
 57. In Harmelin, for example, only Justice Rehnquist joined this portion of Scalia’s 
opinion. Id. at 957. 
 58. Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1001. The other factors are the legislature’s “primacy” in establishing crimes and 
punishments; the acceptability of mandatory and discretionary sentencing schemes; variance 
among state sentencing schemes and that a sentence need not be strictly proportional to the 
corresponding crime. 
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within and outside the particular jurisdiction.61 
Kennedy’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has shifted from the 
more conservative approach in cases such as Harmelin v. Michigan62 
and Ewing v. California63 to joining the majority in finding a violation 
in more recent cases such as Roper v. Simmons.64 In Roper, the Court 
abolished the death penalty for all juveniles under the age of 
eighteen, finding it a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment.65 As the author of the majority 
opinion, Justice Kennedy invoked language from a 1958 decision66 to 
describe the importance “of referring to ‘the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ to determine 
which punishments are so disproportionate as to be ‘cruel and 
unusual.’”67 While not excusing the crimes committed by juveniles, the 
Court focused on the important differences between youths and 
adults; namely, the diminished culpability of youth as a class and 
children’s innate capacity for change.68 Juveniles’ diminished 
culpability rests on their lesser developmental capabilities, increased 
susceptibility to negative influences, and inability to control their 
surroundings. The Court concluded that those characteristics make 
youth less deserving of the harshest forms of punishment.69  
While the two-step test the Court applied in Roper provides a 
standard to judge a sentence’s proportionality, the Court has not 
indicated a process for when the objective indicia are unclear. The 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 957 (holding that mandatory sentence of LWOP for possession of 672 grams 
cocaine did not violate the Eighth Amendment). See also id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(concluding that “Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and 
sentence”). 
 63. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of life sentence 
without parole for three non-violent theft-related offenses). 
 64. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Sheldon Bernard Lyke, Lawrence as an Eighth 
Amendment Case: Sodomy and the Evolving Standards of Decency, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
& L. 633, 647–51 (2009). 
 65. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 (extending its previous decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988), which held the death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles under 
sixteen years old at the time of their crime because “inexperience, less education, and less 
intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct 
while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer 
pressure than is an adult”). 
 66. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 (1958) (holding unconstitutional as beyond Congress’ 
war powers a statute authorizing expatriation of a soldier convicted by military court martial of 
deserting the United States army). 
 67. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560–61. 
 68. Id. at 568–76. 
 69. Id. at 569–70. 
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contrast between the Court’s approaches in Roper70 and in Harmelin71 
illustrate the yet unsettled debate over whether courts are free to 
decide what is morally repugnant and try to predict where the 
country’s moral values are going, or whether judges’ opinions have no 
place in the analysis and thus courts should defer to the states’ 
sentencing schemes. 
State courts are split on whether imposing a JLWOP sentence 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.72 Forty-two state statutes 
permit JLWOP,73 while five states and the District of Columbia 
legislatively prohibit it.74 In twenty-seven of the forty-two states that 
 70. Id. at 569–76. 
 71. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 958 (1991). 
 72. Compare Kentucky (declaring JLWOP unconstitutional, reasoning that “[t]he intent of 
the legislature in providing a penalty of life imprisonment without benefit of parole . . . was to 
deal with dangerous and incorrigible individuals who would be a constant threat to society. We 
believe that incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth. . .” Workman v. Kentucky, 429 S.W.2d 374, 
378 (Ky. 1968), quoted in Brief of Juvenile Law Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 23, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621, and Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412 (U.S. Jul. 
23, 2009) [Hereinafter Brief of Juvenile Law Center]), Nevada (finding that life without parole 
cannot be constitutionally applied to a thirteen year old, reasoning that the “severe penalty” 
should be reserved for only the “the deadliest and most unsalvageable of prisoners,” which a 
child necessarily could not be. Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)), with South 
Carolina (upholding JLWOP for burglary committed by fifteen-year-old upon finding that it 
“does not offend evolving standards of decency so as to constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment. State v. Standard, 569 S.E.2d 325, 206 (S.C. 2002)). Post-Roper, compare Ohio 
(upholding sentence of life without parole for fifteen-year-old convicted for kidnapping and 
rape. State v. Warren, 887 N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio 2008)) with California (declaring the practice 
constitutionally impermissible because “the harshness of an LWOP is particularly evident ‘if the 
person on whom it is inflicted is a minor, who is condemned to live virtually his entire life in 
ignominious confinement, stripped of any opportunity or motive to redeem himself for an act 
attributable to the rash and immature judgment of youth.” In re Nunez, 173 Cal. App. 4th 709, 
736 (2009)). 
 73. The Rest of Their Lives, supra note 1, at 25. 
 74. See D.C. Code. § 22-2104 (a) (2007) (no person who was less than eighteen years of age 
at the time of committing a murder can be sentenced to LWOP); C.R.S.A. § 17-22.5-104 
(2)(d)(iv)(2008) (juveniles charged as adults eligible for parole after forty years); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 21-4622, 21-4635 (2007) (No sentence of life without parole for capital murder where 
defendant is less than eighteen years old); N.Y. Penal Law § 70.00(5) (McKinney 2007) (LWOP 
available only for first-degree murder), N.Y. Penal Law 70.05 (McKinney 2007) (limiting 
indeterminate sentencing for youthful offenders), N.Y. Penal Law 125.27(1)(b) (McKinney 
2007) (required element of first-degree murder is that the defendant is over eighteen years old); 
Or. Rev. Stat. §161.620 (prohibiting LWOP for juveniles tried as adults) (2005), State v. Davilla, 
972 P.2d 902 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (interpreting §161.620 to bar juvenile LWOP). TX PENAL § 
12.31 (2009) (limiting LWOP to forty years before a parole hearing). In addition, the transfer 
statutes in New Jersey bar the imposition of LWOP on a juvenile by designating maximum 
sentences for youth transferred to adult court. Two more states legislatively prohibit LWOP for 
both juveniles and adults. See Alaska Stat. § 12.55.125(a), (h), & (j) (LexisNexis 2007) 
(providing mandatory ninety nine year sentences for enumerated crimes, discretionary ninety 
year sentence in others, but permitting prisoner serving such sentence to apply once for 
modification or reduction of sentence after serving half of the sentence; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-
10 (Supp. 2007) (maximum sentence in state has parole eligibility after thirty years). 
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permit JLWOP, the sentence is mandatory for any person convicted of 
specific enumerated crimes, without regard to the perpetrator’s age.75 
Federal appellate courts have not yet weighed in on the issue post-
Roper. While the Court has not considered an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to any juvenile sentences beyond those imposing death, in 
other contexts, it has recognized the unique developmental status and 
diminished culpability of youth both in criminal and civil matters.76 As 
Justice Frankfurter famously noted, “children have a very special 
place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories and their 
phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if 
uncritically transferred to determination of a State’s duty towards 
children.”77 
IV. ARGUMENTS THAT THE SENTENCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
A.  Objective Indicia Show that JLWOP Does Not Violate the 
Nation’s Evolving Standards of Decency 
A significant factor in the Court’s analysis will be its view of the 
“objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative 
enactments and state practice with respect to” sentences.78 In 
assessing whether there is a national consensus regarding a 
punishment, the Court considers not only the number of states that 
explicitly prohibit a specific penalty, but also a set of more nuanced 
factors, such as the express intent of the legislature and frequency 
with which the penalty is applied.79 In the past, when measuring the 
 75. The Rest of Their Lives, supra note 1, at 25. The twenty-seven states are Alabama, 
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
 76. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (holding that state may require 
parental consent for minors’ reproductive choices because minors often lack capacity to make 
fully informed decisions independently: “We have recognized three reasons justifying the 
conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the 
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, 
mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing”); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (upholding state’s right to restrict minor’s work 
schedule); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990) (holding that due to young citizens’ 
immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment, the State has a legitimate interest in their 
welfare). 
 77. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 78. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2642 (2008) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 563 (2005)). 
 79. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002). The Court has also looked to 
international trends, but only to buttress what it perceives as a consensus in the United States. 
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unc
ent crimes.”87 Arguably, 
such numbers do not make JLWOP unusual. 
 
constitutionality of a sentence applied to juveniles, the Court has 
looked narrowly to state legislatures’ affirmative objectives.80 In 
Thompson, for example, the Court confined its legislative assessment 
to those statutes expressly establishing a minimum age for the death 
penalty.81 Moreover, review of the relevant data and statutes of each 
of the states and the District of Columbia indicates JLWOP’s 
overwhelming continued vitality and a lack of nationwide agreement 
regarding its prohibition.82Unlike the climate leading up to Roper,83 
no national consensus currently exists on declaring
onstitutional.84 
Further, there is an absence of statistical evidence to establish that 
Sullivan’s and Graham’s sentences are actually unusual. Data from 
Florida indicate that JLWOP is not unusual, particularly for offenders 
of Graham’s age.85 In Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court put forth the 
standard that jurisdiction-specific data should guide the 
constitutionality analysis in the absence of an “inference of gross 
disproportionality.”86 Even if that threshold were met here, “7.2% of 
youth offenders nationwide are serving a life without parole sentence 
for crimes other than some type of homicide, such as kidnapping, 
property crimes, sex crimes, and other viol
See, e.g, Roper at 577 (observing that “[i]t is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming 
weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty”). Indeed,“[i]n cases where no 
legislative trend toward abolition existed among the states, the Court has not explored 
international law trends.” Graham Brief of Respondent, supra note 32 at 42 (citing Ewing v. 
California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of life sentence without parole for 
three non-violent theft-related offenses), Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993), and Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)). This means that the Court is unlikely to weigh heavily the fact 
that the United States remains alone in the world in inflicting this punishment. See, e.g., de la 
Vega & Leighton, supra note 3, at 985. 
 80. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822 (1998) (explaining that the Court 
looks to the work product of state legislatures in determining whether the death penalty 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in certain types of cases). 
 81. Id. at 826. 
 82. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–66 (noting that “the enactments of legislatures that have 
addressed the question” provide “essential instruction” toward abolishing the practice). 
 84. Importantly, Roper deviates from Kennedy v. Louisiana, where the Court explicitly 
looked past a growing consensus supporting the death penalty for child rapists to conclude it 
was cruel and unusual. The distinction is simple—one is death; one isn't—but the varied 
analytical approaches are important notwithstanding the fundamental difference in the 
sentences considered. See id.; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2642 (2008). 
 85. Graham Brief of Respondent, supra note 32, at 19. 
 86. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 960 (1991). 
 87. The Rest of Their Lives, supra note 1, at 27. 
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B. Roper Does Not Apply to or Affect Non-Capital Offenses 
The only sentence that the Court has categorically banned and for 
which it has considered the characteristics of the offender in analyzing 
its validity under the Eighth Amendment is the death penalty.88 Prior 
non-homicide Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has examined an 
offense as it relates to the punishment only—not the qualities of the 
offender.89 The Court compares the crime committed to its 
corresponding sentence “to determine whether an inference of gross 
disproportionality exists.”90 The Court has never considered age in 
determining whether the threshold “gross disproportionality” exists.91 
Further, the Court has specifically declined to extend its 
underlying analysis from capital cases to those involving other types 
of punishment. Instead, it has maintained that “[b]ecause a sentence 
of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter 
how long,” capital precedent is of “limited assistance” in analyzing the 
constitutionality of non-capital punishments, no matter how long in 
length.92 In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the Court concluded that “the 
qualitative difference” between the death penalty and any other 
sentence means that capital sentencing “requires a correspondingly 
greater degree of scrutiny.”93 More pointedly, the Court in Roper v. 
Simmons specifically pointed to life without parole as a constitutional 
alternative to the juvenile death penalty’s deterrent effect. 94 Thus, the 
Court unambiguously accepted JLWOP’s availability and 
constitutionality just four years ago. 
Further, extending Roper to JLWOP would raise difficult “line-
drawing” questions.95 For example, does a “life” sentence describe 
only those sentences that specifically impose life imprisonment for 
one crime, or could it also constitute sentences that run consecutively 
for “two or more offenses that effectively amount to (or exceed) the 
actuarial life expectancy of the offender?”96 To facially invalidate 
JLWOP, the Court would need to be untenably specific and 
contemplate many scenarios usually left to state legislatures. 
 88. Graham Brief of Respondent, supra note 32, at 22. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 23 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 91. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005. 
 92. Id. at 45 n.24 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)). 
 93. Id. (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985)). 
 94. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005). 
 95. Graham Brief of Respondent, supra note 32, at 21. 
 96. Id. 
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C. The Criminal Justice System Already Takes Age Into Account. 
Those who perpetrate “[p]articularly heinous acts that stop short 
of causing death or a series of escalating violent acts” should not be 
treated differently “simply because of the fortuity that their victims 
did not die.”97 Victims of crimes perpetrated by juveniles do not suffer 
less simply because of the age of the offenders.98 Instead, juvenile 
offenders’ victims receive fewer rights than the victims of adult 
offenders.99 
The American criminal justice system already accounts for the 
lesser culpability and distinct developmental condition of youthful 
offenders.100 Graham did not challenge the process he received (being 
charged as an adult), which indicates that “his attempt to inject age at 
the sentencing phase is unwarranted.”101 If Graham’s case succeeded 
in the Supreme Court, it would undermine the nationwide practice of 
charging juveniles as adults.102 Graham never contested being charged 
and sentenced as an adult, throughout many stages of trial.103 His 
objection to his sentence at this stage can thus be viewed as 
effectively seeking a constitutional prohibition on states trying and 
sentencing juveniles as adults.104 
Both the state and federal juvenile justice systems consider a 
juvenile’s status in sentencing and punishment.105 In reality, the 
American criminal justice system already accounts for youth’s 
differences and reserves transfer from juvenile court to adult court 
only in the cases of the most heinous crimes. In 2005, fewer than one 
percent of juvenile court cases were transferred to adult court.106 
D. Federalism Prevents the Supreme Court from Abolishing JLWOP.   
 97. Id. at 18. 
 98. Brief Amici Curiae of National Organization of Victims of Juvenile Lifers in Support of 
Respondent at 13, Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (U.S. Sept. 
21, 2009) [hereinafter Brief of Victims of Juvenile Lifers]. 
 99. Id. at 18. This “means the criminal justice system treats victims of the same or similar 
crimes vastly differently solely due to the perpetrator’s age.”  Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Graham Brief of Respondent, supra note 32, at 19. 
 101. Graham Brief of Respondent, supra note 32, at 19. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 50 n.29. 
 104. Id. (quoting State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 163 (S.C. 2007) (rejecting an argument 
similar to Graham’s as outside the scope of the Eighth Amendment, which deals with 
punishment only)). 
 105. Id. at 150–51. 
 106. Brief of Victims of Juvenile Lifers, supra note 98, at 27 (citing Office of Justice 
Programs, Delinquency Cases Waived to Criminal Court, 2005, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 
2009)). 
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Overturning JLWOP would create a slippery slope by interfering 
with the state’s exercise of its police power.107 The Court has been 
unwilling to “micro-manage” the states’ various sentencing regimes 
and undermine judges’ and prosecutors’ discretion.108 Instead, it has 
typically accorded deference to legislatures in sentencing and 
punishment decisions. In Solem, the Court expressly emphasized that 
appellate courts “should grant substantial deference to the broad 
authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types 
and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the discretion that 
trial courts possess in sentencing convicted criminals.”109 The Court 
has very rarely sought to infringe on states’ rights to determine their 
own sentencing schemes. 
V. ARGUMENTS THAT JLWOP IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
A.  Objective Indicia Show that Evolving Standards of Decency Have 
Rejected JLWOP in Practice. 
1. JLWOP is Unusual Punishment for Sullivan and Graham’s 
Non-Homicide Crimes. 
 Unusual can describe statistical as well as qualitative 
classifications. With respect to the statistical side, Sullivan’s 
punishment is unusual because only one other offender in the country, 
also located in Florida, is serving a life sentence for a non-homicide 
crime committed at age thirteen.110 The rarity of JLWOP sentences 
imposed for thirteen-year-old offenders demonstrates a clear societal 
repudiation of their use in the United States.111 Although a majority of 
states have statutes that would allow JLWOP, almost none of the 
states that statutorily permit JLWOP have ever actually imposed the 
sentence on a minor as young as Sullivan.112 Forty-four states, the 
District of Columbia and the federal government have never 
sentenced a thirteen-year-old to JLWOP.113 Currently, only nine 
 107. Graham Brief of Respondent, supra note 32, at 57 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 
U.S. 263, 303 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
 108. Id. at 59 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 381–82). 
 109. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). 
 110. Sullivan Brief of Petitioner, supra note 6, at (i). 
 111. Id. at 6. 
 112. Id. at 52. 
 113. Id. 
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Americans are currently serving life without parole sentences for any 
type of offense committed at age thirteen, and sixty-four others for 
crimes committed at age fourteen—collectively, they represent the 
total number of youth of those ages sentenced to LWOP over a thirty-
year period.114 In the same thirty-year period, at least a quarter of a 
million juveniles under age fifteen were arrested for offenses for 
which they could have received LWOP.115 
Graham’s sentence is also unusual when compared to other 
sentences for the same crime in Florida, as well as across the country. 
The average length of a prison sentence for adults in Florida for 
armed burglary is under nine years,116 making Graham’s punishment a 
gross deviation from the norm in his state, as applied to adults. 
Further, only one other state statutorily allows JLWOP for an 
offender with Graham’s specific crime and characteristics, and that 
state, South Carolina, has never imposed the sentence.117 No juveniles 
outside of Florida are currently serving life without parole sentences 
for any sort of burglary, robbery, carjacking, or battery offense.118 
Florida deviates from the national trend in its continued 
imposition of JLWOP for non-homicide offenses.119 Only five other 
states have juveniles serving LWOP sentences for non-homicides, and 
each has imposed the sentence at a much lower rate than has 
Florida.120 In almost all JLWOP cases for offenders of any age, the 
offense was murder.121 The infrequency of the sentence’s imposition 
provides a much more accurate indicator of the national attitude 
toward its validity, which is one of repudiation. 
2. JLWOP is Cruel Punishment for Sullivan and Graham’s Non-
Homicide Crimes. 
In addition to being unusual, Sullivan and Graham’s sentences are 
cruel in their failure to recognize the influence of each youth’s 
respective family life and upbringing. Because adolescents like 
 114. Id. at 50–51. 
 115. Id. at 51. 
 116. Graham Brief of Petitioner, supra note 27, at 58 (describing the average sentences 
Florida meted out in 2003-2004 to offenders of any age). 
 117. Id. at 61. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 63. 
 120. Id. Compare seventy-seven in Florida to one in South Carolina, one in Nebraska, six in 
Iowa, and four in California (a state whose Supreme Court has since invalidated the practice). 
 121. Sullivan Brief of Petitioner, supra note 6, at 53; See also Graham Brief of Petitioner, 
supra note 27, at 64 (citing The Rest of Their Lives, supra note 1, at 27). 
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Sullivan and Graham are more easily influenced by their 
surroundings, and less capable of controlling their home and 
neighborhood situations, they are more vulnerable to circumstances 
that may “exert pressure toward crime.”122 Moreover, both Sullivan 
and Graham’s crimes involved co-offenders, which is consistent with 
psychological research indicating that “juvenile crime is significantly 
correlated with exposure to delinquent peers”123 and “adolescents are 
much more likely than adults to commit crimes in groups.”124 Both 
Sullivan and Graham’s JLWOP sentences fail to consider the unique 
biological characteristics and situational factors caused by their youth 
that contributed to their criminal behavior. The sentences also do not 
allow for the capacity to change that characterizes adolescence. 
Accordingly, “[c]ondemning an immature, vulnerable, and not-yet-
fully-formed adolescent to die in prison is a constitutionally 
disproportionate punishment.”125 
B.  JLWOP is Analogous to the Death Penalty, Which the Court 
Deemed Unconstitutional for Juveniles in Roper v. Simmons. 
The same qualitative characteristics unique to youth that make 
the death penalty unconstitutional for juvenile offenders make life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole impermissible for 
minors. As Roper v. Simmons recognized, because youth are less 
culpable, less likely to be deterred, and much more likely to be 
rehabilitated than adults who commit similar crimes, retribution 
against children is less justified.126 Moreover, without the option of 
parole, a life sentence “is in a very real sense final: it condemns the 
offender to die in prison without affording him any opportunity to 
demonstrate a reformed moral character that might warrant 
release.”127 A life sentence without parole is especially inappropriate 
for a juvenile who will never have the opportunity to live as a free 
adult128 or, in the Roper court’s words, realize his “potential to attain a 
mature understanding of his own humanity”129 outside the confines of 
 122. Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
15–16, Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (U.S. Jul. 23 2009) 
[hereinafter Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n]. 
 123. Id. at 17. 
 124. Id. at 18. 
 125. Id. at 5. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). 
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a prison cell. Indeed, for offenders sentenced to life without parole as 
youth, death can be viewed as a more humane alternative to 
subsisting with the knowledge that they will spend the remaining 
decades of their lives within a maximum security prison.130 
1. Youth have Diminished Culpability as a Class and Have Been 
Treated Uniquely in the Criminal Justice System 
Supreme Court jurisprudence in both civil and criminal matters 
has demonstrated a longstanding recognition of the unique 
developmental status of youth. The Court has emphasized that youth 
“is a time and condition of life when a person may be most 
susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”131 Roper 
reaffirmed the consistent view that youth are “categorically less 
culpable than the average criminal.”132 Even older adolescents lack 
the mature judgment faculties of an adult and as a result have a 
greater propensity toward risky, including criminal, behavior.133 
Moreover, even seventeen-year-olds have lower aptitude for 
understanding long and short-term consequences, and lesser ability to 
empathize than do adults.134 It is not until age twenty-one that 
individuals experience “tremendous gains in emotional maturity, 
impulse control and decision making” that continue until the brain 
 130. Brief of Former Juvenile Offenders Charles S. Dutton, et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Sullivan v. Florida (No. 08-7621) and Graham v. Florida (No. 08-7412) at 
31 (U.S. Jul. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Brief of Former Juvenile Offenders] (arguing that their own 
histories as former juvenile offenders who have accomplished and contributed at the highest 
levels, both nationally and internationally in a variety of fields, illustrates the inherent capacity 
of youth to change and opportunities for positive change foreclosed by sentences like JLWOP 
(quoting Charles S. Dutton, who grew up in impoverished Baltimore and served several prison 
sentences (during which he earned his GED and Associates Degree), before earning an MFA 
degree from Yale drama school and winning Tony and Emmy awards, “[i]f I know I can never 
get out of prison, that’s as good as dead to me . . . I would prefer the death penalty to a life 
sentence without the possibility of parole.”)). 
 131. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982). 
 132. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)); 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
 133. Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra note 122, at 3–4 (Developmental 
psychology and neuroscience research has found that “juveniles—including older adolescents—
are less able to restrain their impulses and exercise self-control; less capable than adults of 
considering alternative courses of action and maturely weighing risks and rewards; and less 
oriented to the future and thus less capable of apprehending the consequences of their often-
impulsive actions. For all those reasons, even once their general cognitive abilities approximate 
those of adults, juveniles are less capable than adults of mature judgment, and more likely to 
engage in risky, even criminal, behavior as a result of that immaturity.”). 
 134. Id. at 12 (quoting Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)Maturity of 
Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. 
& L. 741, 746, 748, 754, tbl. 4 (2000) (citing a study of over 1,000 adults and adolescents)). 
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becomes fully developed in the mid-twenties.135 Recognizing this fact, 
the Court has sought to ensure ongoing access to a rehabilitative, 
rather than retaliatory, juvenile justice system,136 and has foreclosed 
constitutional application of the juvenile death penalty.137 If the Court 
views and applies these characteristics unique to youth in the same 
way as it did in Roper v. Simmons, JLWOP will be ripe for abolition.138 
2. Imposing Life Sentences without the Possibility of Parole Fails 
to Recognize Youth’s Capacity to Change 
 The Court’s conclusion in Roper about juvenile culpability was 
rooted in its appreciation that the personalities of adolescents are 
“more transitory” and “less fixed” than those of adults.139 The Court 
has consistently demonstrated an understanding that “the signature 
qualities of youth are transient,” which mitigates against juveniles’ 
meriting the harshest punishments because their negative behavioral 
tendencies may abate.140 Roper further recognized the difficulty that 
even the foremost psychological experts have in distinguishing 
between juveniles who commit criminal offenses as a result of 
“irreparable corruption” and those whose youthful immaturity 
manifests in making especially poor decisions.141 On the whole, 
juvenile criminal conduct generally reflects “experimentation with 
risky behavior” rather than “deep-seated moral deficiency reflective 
 135. Brief of Juvenile Law Center, supra note 72, at 17 n.4 (citing Dr. Paul Thompson et al., 
The Child’s Developing Brain, The New York Times, Sept. 15, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2008/09/15/health/20080915-brain-
development.html?scp=1&sq=interactive%20compare%20brain %20development%20 in%20 
various% 20areas%20&st=cse ; Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra note 122 at 23 
(“[T]he brain systems that govern many aspects of social and emotional maturity, such as 
impulse control, weighing risks and rewards, planning ahead, and simultaneously considering 
multiple sources of information,as well as the coordination of emotion and cognition, continue 
to mature throughout adolescence.”). 
 136. See Brief of Juvenile Law Center, supra note 72, at 12 (citing McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 539–40 (1971)); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967); BARRY C. 
FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 92 (1999) 
(noting that the malleability of youth is central to the rehabilitative model of the juvenile court). 
 137. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 138. See Brief of Amici Curiae J. Lawrence Aber, et al. in Support of Petitioners, Sullivan v. 
Florida (No. 08-7621) and Graham v. Florida (No. 08-7412) at 13 (U.S. Jul. 23, 2009) 
[hereinafter Brief of J. Lawrence Aber]. These Amici represent an interdisciplinary group of 
psychologists, psychiatrists, social scientists, and neuroscientists who study adolescent 
development and behavior and social policy. Id. 
 139. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
 140. Brief of Juvenile Law Center, supra note 72 at 8 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 
350, 368 (1993)). 
 141. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (discussing “the rule forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing 
any patient under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder”). 
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of ‘bad’ character.”142 
Roper reflects the Court’s unease with inflicting an unalterable 
sentence on a child who has the capacity to mature and change. The 
Court determined that equating the mistakes of minors with those of 
adults is “misguided” because minors have much greater potential to 
reform,143 which makes their reckless conduct less “morally 
reprehensible.”144 As a result, “it is less supportable to conclude that 
even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of 
irretrievably depraved character.”145 Juveniles who receive 
professional treatment demonstrate that behavioral reform is 
possible.146 
VI. DISPOSITION 
Incarceration serves several goals within the American criminal 
justice system: deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation.147 JLWOP 
advances only retribution, which is less justified for youth given their 
reduced culpability. While it is true that imposing JLWOP promotes 
the additional aim of protecting society from those who have been 
incarcerated,148 the sentence’s failure to further other fundamental 
aims satisfactorily renders it unjustifiable in light of the ethical, social, 
and legal costs associated with its perpetuation. 
Petitioners are not asking for the release of dangerous individuals 
who have not reformed or proven their remorse. Instead, they merely 
seek to protect the opportunity for juveniles to demonstrate their 
unique capacity to change and reform. Certainly, “[i]t is impossible to 
know what any juvenile offender will grow up to become. But it is also 
impossible to conclude that any juvenile offender has no redeeming 
potential, and therefore should be locked away for life without no 
possibility of parole.”149 Accordingly, the Court should hold sentencing 
a child to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
 142. Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra note 122, at 20. 
 143. Id. at 570. 
 144. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Brief of J. Lawrence Aber, supra note 138, at 1. 
 147. See, e.g., Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1314 (1981); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, at 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008). 
 148. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 n. 28 (1976) (“Another purpose that has been 
discussed is the incapacitation of dangerous criminals and the consequent prevention of crimes 
that they may otherwise commit in the future”). 
 149. Brief of Former Juvenile Offenders, supra note 130, at 4. 
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unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment. 
The Supreme Court, however, is unlikely to declare JLWOP 
sentences facially unconstitutional in these cases. At best, the Court is 
likely to find JLWOP sentences unconstitutional as applied to the 
specific facts of the two cases or, even more likely, as applied only the 
facts of Sullivan v. Florida, where the offender was very young at the 
time of his conviction.150 The Court’s determination likely will rest on 
Justice Kennedy’s view of the proportionality analysis as applied both 
to the specific facts of Sullivan and Graham, and to juvenile life 
without parole sentences more broadly. 
A significant factor in the Court’s analysis will be its view of the 
“objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative 
enactments and state practice with respect to” sentences.151 In 
assessing whether there is a national consensus regarding a 
punishment, the Court considers not only of the number of states that 
explicitly prohibit a penalty, but also a set of more nuanced factors, 
such as the express intent of the legislature and frequency with which 
the penalty is applied.152 In the past, when measuring the 
constitutionality of a sentence applied to juveniles, the Court has 
looked narrowly to the express intent of state legislatures.153 In 
Thompson, for example, the Court confined its legislative assessment 
to those statutes expressly establishing a minimum age for the death 
penalty.154 Moreover, review of the relevant data and statutes of each 
of the states and the District of Columbia indicates JLWOP’s 
overwhelming, continued vitality and a lack of nationwide agreement 
 150. Additionally, Sullivan has been diagnosed as mentally disabled. Sullivan Brief of 
Petitioner, supra note 6, at 22 n.25. 
 151. Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2642 (2008) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 555, 563 
(2005)). 
 152. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002). The Court has also looked to 
international trends, but only to buttress what it perceives as a consensus in the United States. 
See, e.g, Roper at 577 (observing that “[i]t is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming 
weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty”). Indeed,“[i]n cases where no 
legislative trend toward abolition existed among the states, the Court has not explored 
international law trends.” Graham Brief of Respondent, supra note 32, at 42 (citing Ewing v. 
California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of life sentence without parole for 
three non-violent theft-related offenses), Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993), and Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)). This means that the Court is unlikely to weigh heavily the fact 
that the United States remains alone in the world in inflicting this punishment. See, e.g., de la 
Vega & Leighton, supra note 3, at 985 (2008). 
 153. See, e.g. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822 (1998) (explaining that the Court 
looks to the work product of state legislatures in determining whether the death penalty 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in certain types of cases). 
 154. Id. at 826. 
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regarding its prohibition.Unlike the climate leading up to Roper,155 no 
national consensus currently exists on declaring JLWOP sentences 
unconstitutional. 
Further, in its Eighth Amendment precedent involving 
proportionality review of prison terms, the Court has almost always 
upheld protracted sentences for non-homicide offenses.156 Though not 
specifically in the context of juvenile offenders, the Court specifically 
cautioned that “the relative lack of objective standards concerning 
terms of imprisonment has meant that ‘[o]utside the context of capital 
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular 
sentences [are] exceedingly rare.’”157 Ultimately, American society 
views the death penalty as a lightening rod issue but does not focus in 
the same way on the duration of incarceration. Indeed, as evidenced 
by the extreme numbers of incarcerated individuals in our country, it 
would be fair to say that American society takes comfort in putting 
“bad” people behind bars, believing that that act affords greater 
protection against crime. 
Though the many goals of incarceration argue against the use of 
JLWOP sentencing, prior jurisprudence and a concern for the 
sovereignty of state legislatures in determining criminal sentencing 
will most likely lead the Court to uphold JLWOP as constitutional or 
find it unconstitutional only as narrowly tailored to the facts of the 
Sullivan and Graham cases. 
 
 155. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–66 (noting that “the enactments of legislatures that have 
addressed the question” provide “essential instruction” toward abolishing the practice). 
 156. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (holding a mandatory life sentence 
imposed for a defendant’s third theft conviction did not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment where the total amount stolen amounted to less than $230 for three thefts); 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (holding a mandatory life sentence without parole, 
without considering mitigating factors, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment for 
possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine). 
 157. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289–90 (1983)). 
